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NORTH SEA ECONOMICS 
 
Research in North Sea Economics has been conducted in the Economics Department 
since 1973.  The present and likely future effects of oil and gas developments on the 
Scottish economy formed the subject of a long term study undertaken for the Scottish 
Office.  The final report of this study, The Economic Impact of North Sea Oil on 
Scotland, was published by HMSO in 1978.  In more recent years further work has been 
done on the impact of oil on local economies and on the barriers to entry and 
characteristics of the supply companies in the offshore oil industry. 
 
The second and longer lasting theme of research has been an analysis of licensing and 
fiscal regimes applied to petroleum exploitation.  Work in this field was initially 
financed by a major firm of accountants, by British Petroleum, and subsequently by the 
Shell Grants Committee.  Much of this work has involved analysis of fiscal systems in 
other oil producing countries including Australia, Canada, the United States, Indonesia, 
Egypt, Nigeria and Malaysia.  Because of the continuing interest in the UK fiscal 
system many papers have been produced on the effects of this regime. 
 
From 1985 to 1987 the Economic and Social Science Research Council financed 
research on the relationship between oil companies and Governments in the UK, 
Norway, Denmark and The Netherlands.  A main part of this work involved the 
construction of Monte Carlo simulation models which have been employed to measure 
the extents to which fiscal systems share in exploration and development risks. 
 
Over the last few years the research has examined the many evolving economic issues 
generally relating to petroleum investment and related fiscal and regulatory matters.  
Subjects researched include the economics of incremental investments in mature oil 
fields, economic aspects of the CRINE initiative, economics of gas developments and 
contracts in the new market situation, economic and tax aspects of tariffing, economics 
of infrastructure cost sharing, the effects of comparative petroleum fiscal systems on 
incentives to develop fields and undertake new exploration, the oil price responsiveness 
of the UK petroleum tax system, and the economics of decommissioning, mothballing 
and re-use of facilities.  This work has been financed by a group of oil companies and 
Scottish Enterprise, Energy.  The work on CO2 Capture, EOR and storage was financed 
by a grant from the Natural Environmental Research Council (NERC) in the period 
2005 – 2008.  
 
For 2016 the programme examines the following subjects: 
 
a. Decommissioning Tax Relief 
b. Further Research on Economics of EOR with Emphasis on Tax 
c. Collaborative Agreements among Licensees: Cluster Developments 
d. Collaborative Agreements among Licensees and Contractors 
e. Facilitation of Decommissioning Cost Reductions including by Collaboration 
f. Prospects for Activity in the UKCS to 2050 
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Economic and Tax Issues relating to Decommissioning  
in the UKCS: the 2016 Perspective 
Professor Alex Kemp and Linda Stephen 
Aberdeen Centre for Research in Energy Economics and Finance (ACREEF) 
 
1. Introduction and Context 
Decommissioning activity in the UK Continental Shelf (UKCS) is set to 
increase substantially.  There are many estimates of the possible costs and 
their timing.  Before the oil price collapse the present authors produced 
detailed estimates indicating that in the period 2014-2050 the cumulative 
costs could amount to £45 billion at 2014 prices with real long term oil and 
gas prices of $90 and 58 pence, and £42 billion with long term prices of 
$70 and 45 pence1.  Such estimates are subject to much uncertainty.  There 
is evidence that the costs were initially underestimated with respect to both 
the volume of work required and the prices of the equipment and services 
needed to undertake the work.  As experience of the activity grows there 
should be a learning by doing effect which reduces the costs.  The initiative 
taken by the Oil and Gas Authority (OGA) recently expressed in their 
report Decommissioning Strategy should also produce cost reductions.  But 
currently there remains much uncertainty regarding their likely extent. 
 
The current major oil price volatility adds to the uncertainties regarding the 
timing of cessation of production (COP) and the commencement of 
decommissioning work.  When fields are operating at a loss as a result of 
an oil price fall there is an obvious incentive to cease production and then 
decommission the facilities.  But in making such a decision, an operator 
                                                 
1 See A.G. Kemp and L. Stephen, Price Sensitivity, Capital Rationing and Future Activity in the UK Continental 
Shelf after the Wood Review, North Sea Study Occasional Paper No.130, Aberdeen Centre for Research in 
Energy Economics and Finance (ACREEF), November 2014, pp.41 http://www.abdn.ac.uk/research/acreef/  
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could also consider the possible future oil price which might make it 
rational to tolerate current losses in the expectation of future profits with a 
higher oil price.  He may also consider the benefit of postponing the time 
when he has to undertake substantial expenditures on the decommissioning 
activity.  In sum he may estimate his remaining net present value (RNPV) 
which could be consistent with tolerating operating losses for some time.   
 
In estimating RNPV the tax system applied both to the income from field 
production and the relief available for the decommissioning costs are 
relevant to decision-making.  The relief available for the decommissioning 
costs can easily affect the timing of the COP decision and the maximisation 
of economic recovery including investment in late life incremental 
projects.  The investor will make his calculation on the basis that his 
objective is to maximise his post-tax RNPV.  This may or may not be 
consistent with the maximisation of pre-tax RNPV. 
 
In this paper the operation of the complex tax system relating to late field 
life and decommissioning issues is elucidated with a high level objective 
being to examine whether the system is consistent with the attainment of 
maximum economic recovery.  Investment incentives in incremental 
projects could be influenced by their effects on decommissioning relief.  
Late field life asset values can also be affected by decommissioning relief.  
This study seeks to elucidate the intricacies of the likely rates of relief. 
 
2. The Tax Arrangements Relating to Decommissioning 
As a general statement decommissioning costs are allowed as deductions 
for Petroleum Revenue Tax (PRT), Corporation Tax (CT) and 
Supplementary Charge (SC).  For CT and SC the costs give rise to capital 
allowances which are available on 100% first year basis as for other 
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investment costs.  With PRT the decommissioning losses are clawed back 
and set against PRT income in earlier years.  The PRT liability is then 
recalculated and refunds made.  The refunds are subject to CT and SC in 
the year when the refunds are actually made.  PRT refunds relate to periods 
earlier in field life.  In recognition of this (simple) interest is given on the 
refunds.  The interest rates applicable to the refunds have varied 
substantially through time depending on market conditions.  In recent years 
they have been very low but in the 1980’s and 1990’s they were very much 
higher.  The interest is tax free.  For many years a cap has been placed on 
the size of the PRT refunds plus interest repaid.  When PRT was at 75% 
the cap in any one year was 85% of the PRT loss attributable to that year.  
When the PRT rate became 50% the cap on the repayment was 60% of the 
loss, and when it was reduced to 35% the cap became 45% of the loss.  
When there is an overall field loss this can be set against PRT income in 
another field. 
 
When the PRT loss is clawed back issues arise with their interaction with 
the oil allowance and safeguard.  Thus the decommissioning losses carried 
back have to be set against earlier profits before use of the oil allowance 
and safeguard.  This means that the decommissioning loss can displace the 
oil allowance and safeguard to a greater or less extent.  For a large field 
which produces for a substantial time beyond the last period when the oil 
allowance was used there should be no displacement from 
decommissioning losses.  But for medium and small fields there is a higher 
chance that the decommissioning losses displace the oil allowance.  (It will 
be recalled that the volume allowance is generally spread over 10 years). 
 
For CT and SC the general rules are that decommissioning losses in a field 
can be set against current income from other fields, carried forward against 
4 
 
future income, or carried back against past income in the UKCS.  Prior to 
2008 losses could be clawed back for a maximum of 3 years.  Since then 
they can be clawed back to 2002. 
 
When the rate of SC was increased from 20% to 32% in 2011 a restriction 
on the rate of relief for SC to 20% was introduced.  When the combined 
rate of CT plus SC exceeded 50% the rate of relief was curtailed to 50% 
for non-PRT fields.  When the PRT rate was 50% and the top marginal rate 
on income was 81% the overall rate of relief for decommissioning on PRT 
fields was 75%.  When the PRT rate was reduced to 35% and the SC 
became 20% the overall rate of relief on PRT fields became 67.5% and on 
a non-PRT fields it was 50%.  In 2016 when the PRT rate became 0% and 
the SC rate 10% the rate of relief for decommissioning became 40%. 
 
But there are further aspects which need to be considered.  Over the last 
few years various Field Allowances, Brownfield Allowance, and an 
Investment Allowance have been introduced against the SC.  When 
decommissioning losses are clawed back against past SC income they are 
utilised before the Investment Allowance or Field Allowance which can be 
displaced as a consequence.  The effect on incentives to engage in late field 
life incremental projects is noteworthy and is examined in this paper. 
 
It should be noted that the operation of the 0% rate of PRT is such that 
when decommissioning losses are clawed back to periods when the 0% rate 
applies the PRT taxable income in such periods is reduced to a minimum 
of £0 by the eligible loss.  No relief is available in such a period because 
no PRT has been paid. 
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In this paper the objectives are to measure the effective rates of relief for 
both old fields subject to PRT and new ones which are non-PRT paying.  
Further objectives are to examine the effects of the tax system on the 
decisions to engage in late field life incremental investments and on the 
determination of COP dates. 
 
3. Modelling Procedure 
The modelling procedure adopted involved the selection of a number of 
representative fields to reflect the circumstances surrounding 
decommissioning of fields being developed in (1) the early 1990s and (2) 
in 2016.  In each case a set of fields representative in terms of (1) size of 
reserves, (2) development and operating costs, and (3) decommissioning 
costs, was chosen.  Decommissioning costs modelled as a percentage of 
the development costs at 1991 values were increased to reflect their real 
increase.  A sensitivity analysis was also undertaken with respect to all the 
three categories of costs.  Incremental projects of various sizes and costs 
undertaken in the mature years of the lives of the fields of both vintages 
were also modelled. 
 
Financial simulation modelling was undertaken to calculate pre- and post-
tax returns.  The modelling calculated the economic limit for the lives of 
the fields and so estimated the maximum feasible economic recovery.  
Investment in the old fields started in 1991.  Historic values for oil prices 
and inflation were employed for the periods up to and including 2015.  For 
2016 and subsequent years prices of $40, $50, and $60 in real terms were 
employed.  In calculating the real returns 1991 was taken as the base year.  
Real net present values (NPVs) were calculated to this base year.  The full 
tax system in place from 1991 onwards, and modified many times over the 
years, was incorporated in the economic model.  For future years the 
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current system reflecting the changes announced in Budget 2016 was 
employed. 
 
Development of the new fields was assumed to start in 2016.  Reflecting 
the most likely current situation the modelling of the tax system was 
undertaken on a project basis.  Thus use of the Ring Fence Expenditure 
Supplement (RFES) for the SC was incorporated.  Decommissioning relief 
was also calculated on a project basis.  Thus losses were clawed back and 
taxes recalculated.  For the new fields another scenario where 
decommissioning losses were set against income from other fields for CT 
and SC was also calculated. 
 
In all cases the modelling highlighted the effective relief for 
decommissioning.  The extent to which effective relief is curtailed through 
displacement of other allowances, such as Investment Allowance, and 
Field Allowances for SC, and oil and safeguard allowances for PRT, are 
highlighted.  The potential effect of incremental investments in the mature 
years of field life in affecting effective relief both negatively and positively 
was calculated.  The issue of whether any curtailment of effective relief 
can inhibit investment in incremental projects and so affect maximum 
economic recovery was investigated.  The relationship between the 
effective relief for decommissioning and the effective rate of tax over the 
life of the field was also calculated.  In this exercise the effective rate of 
tax over the life of the field was taken to be before decommissioning relief 
in order to highlight any differences. 
 
In the results shown in Section 4 below the key assumptions for each field 
and incremental project are shown separately for the convenience of the 
reader. 
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4. Results 
A. Old (1991) Fields 
Field No.1: 50 mmbbls:  Low cost:  $50 future price 
Real devex/bbl: $5.25 (1991 value) 
Real opex/bbl: $5.46 (1991 value) 
Real decommissioning cost: 15% of devex (1991 value) 
On this field the economic limit was reached in 2010 with cumulative 
production of 50.5 mmbbls.  No PRT was paid on the field and not all 
of the oil allowance was utilised.  This resulted from the long period 
taken to recover investment costs and utilise the uplift for PRT in the 
1990’s given the relatively low oil prices and the modest annual 
production from the field.  When decommissioning costs were clawed 
back there was no effective PRT relief.  The losses displaced the oil 
allowance, but, as noted above no PRT was in any case paid on this 
field.  Full relief for CT and SC was achieved giving a total of 50%.   
 
Field No.2: 50 mmbbls:  Medium cost:  $50 future price 
Real devex/bbl: $7.50 (1991 value) 
Real opex/bbl: $6.44 (1991 value) 
Real decommissioning cost: 15% of devex (1991 value) 
On this field the economic limit is reached in 2010.  No PRT is paid and 
the field does not use all its oil allowance.  The decommissioning losses 
displace the oil allowance, but in any case there is no effective PRT 
relief.  There is full relief for CT and SC at a combined rate of 50%.   
  
Field No.3: 50 mmbbls:  High cost:  $50 future price 
Real devex/bbl: $9.00 (1991 value) 
Read opex/bbl: $7.73 (1991 value) 
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Real decommissioning cost: 15% of devex (1991 value) 
On this field the economic limit was reached in 2010.  No PRT was 
payable and thus no effective relief was obtained for this tax.  Relief for 
CT and SC at a combined rate of 50% was obtained.   
 
Field No.4: 200 mmbbls:  Low cost:  $50 future price 
Real devex/bbl: $5.25 (1991 value) 
Real opex/bbl: $5.69 (1991 value) 
Real decommissioning cost: 15% of devex (1991 value) 
The economic limit for this field was attained in 2018 with accumulated 
production of 204.7 mmbbls.  
This field paid PRT of £306 million before decommissioning (at 1991 
prices), but only achieved PRT relief of 13.5% because the 
decommissioning cost was substantially clawed back to years in which 
the PRT rate was zero.   The relief for CT is at 30% and for SC 11.35% 
(reflecting the long period of claw back and the changes to the SC rate).  
When CT and SC tax or PRT refunds is taken into account the overall 
rate of relief is 50%.   
 
Field No. 4b: 200 mmbbls: but with decommissioning costs increased 
to 25% of real devex at 1991 prices:  $50 future oil price 
As with Field No.4 PRT payments of £306 million at 1991 prices are 
made before decommissioning.  PRT relief achieved is 28.12%.   Relief 
for SC is 12.81% less the SC paid on PRT refunds and CT relief is 30% 
less CT paid on PRT refunds giving total relief at 60%. 
 
Field No. 4c:  Field No.4 except COP accelerated to 2015 to achieve 
higher rate of decommissioning relief:  $50 future oil price 
9 
 
Accumulated production is reduced to 200 mmbbls but both pre-tax and 
post-tax NPVs are reduced.  Effective decommissioning relief increases 
to 71%, but the cost is a reduction in the post-tax NPV. 
 
Field No.4: 200 mmbbls:  Low Cost:   $40 future price 
Accumulated production is 203.8 mmbbls and the economic limit is in 
2017.  PRT paid before decommissioning is still £306 million.  
Decommissioning relief for PRT is obtained at 26.12%.  Full relief is 
obtained for CT and SC with the combined rate being 42.6% less the 
CT and SC paid on PRT refunds.  Total relief is 59%.   It was 50% in 
the case when the future oil price was $50.   
 
Field No.4: 200 mmbbls:  Low Cost:  $60 future oil price 
In this scenario the economic limit is in 2018.  PRT payments before 
decommissioning are still £306 million at 1991 prices.  There is no PRT 
relief in this case because all of the decommissioning costs are clawed 
back in years when the PRT rate is zero.   Relief for CT and SC 
combined is at 40% compared to 50% at the $50 price.   
 
The 3 cases of Field No.4 discussed above indicate that the rate of 
decommissioning relief is inversely related to future oil prices, 
revenues, and so NPVs.  This is because the lower oil prices and 
revenues plus the earlier attainment of the economic limit result in more 
of decommissioning losses being clawed back into periods when the SC 
and PRT rates were higher and thus the rate of relief is also higher. 
 
Field No.5: 200 mmbbls:  Medium Cost:  $50 future price 
The economic limit is reached in 2017.  Accumulated production is 
203.8 mmbbls.  In this case PRT payments of £43 million at 1991 prices 
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are made before decommissioning.  When PRT losses are clawed back 
they obtain relief at 27.4%.  Some of the decommissioning costs are 
clawed back to years when the PRT rate is zero and there is some 
displacement of oil allowance.  Full relief is obtained for CT and at 
13.4% for SC giving an overall rate of relief of 56%. 
 
Field No.5: 200 mmbbls:  Medium Cost:  $40 future price 
In this case cumulative production is 203.8 mmbbls.  PRT payments of 
£43 million are made before decommissioning.  The field can use all of 
the oil allowance before decommissioning but not after.   PRT relief is 
reduced to 36.4% because of displaced oil allowance and the cost being 
clawed back to some years when the PRT rate is zero.  Full relief for 
CT at 30% (minus the CT paid on PRT relief) is available and for SC 
the effective relief is at 15.24% (minus the SC paid on PRT relief).  The 
overall rate of relief is 58%. 
 
Field No.5: 200 mmbbls:  Medium Cost:  $60 future oil price 
In this case the economic limit is reached in 2018 when cumulative 
production is 204.7 mmbbls.  PRT paid before decommissioning is 
again £43 million.  The field can use all of the oil allowance before and 
after decommissioning, but PRT relief is only 18.18% because costs are 
clawed back in some years when the PRT rate is zero. 
Relief for CT is at 30% and for SC at 11.8% minus the CT and SC paid 
on PRT relief.  Total relief is 53%. 
 
A comparison of the results for the 200 mmbbls field over the range of 
future oil prices shows that the rate of effective relief is inversely related 
to the oil price.  At the lower oil prices the decommissioning losses are 
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clawed back over a longer period because of the lower revenues and 
obtain relief at the higher historic SC and PRT rates. 
 
Field No.6: 200 mmbbls: High Cost with devex $8.25/bbl (1991) and 
opex $8.94/bbl (1991): $50 future oil price 
In this case the economic limit is reached in 2017.  In this high cost case 
no PRT is paid on the field.  Not all of the PRT oil allowance is used 
before decommissioning.  Decommissioning relief for PRT is in any 
case ineffective because of the 0% rate and the displacement of some 
of the oil allowance.  But no PRT was payable on the field.  Full relief 
is available for CT and SC giving a combined rate of 47%. 
 
At the $40 price the field does not pay PRT or use all of its PRT oil 
allowance before decommissioning.  Decommissioning relief is 
ineffective because of the 0% PRT rate and some displacement of the 
oil allowance.  But PRT paid is in any case zero.  Full relief for CT and 
SC is obtained giving an effective rate of relief of 49%. 
 
At the $60 price no PRT is paid.  The oil allowance is still not fully 
utilised.  Decommissioning relief for PRT is ineffective because of the 
0% rate and some displacement of the oil allowance.  Full relief for CT 
and SC is obtained at a combined rate of 46%. 
 
A comparison of the rates of relief for the 200 mmbbls field under the 
3 oil prices scenarios again indicates that the effective rate is higher 
with lower oil prices because the lower revenues result in losses being 
clawed back for longer periods and thus into periods when the SC rate 
was higher. 
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Field No.7: 500 mmbbls:  Low Cost:  $50 future oil price 
In this scenario accumulated production to the economic limit is 503 
mmbbls.  COP is in 2023.  Substantial PRT of £925m. in real terms at 
1991 prices is paid.  However, there is no decommissioning relief for 
this tax as all the costs are set against income when the PRT rate is 0%.  
Relief is obtained for CT and SC at a combined rate of 40%.   
 
It is noteworthy that if a Decommissioning Relief Deed (DRD) were in 
place and PRT were abolished rather than set at 0% rate 
decommissioning relief would have been much higher at 71%.  It was 
also found that if the decommissioning costs were very much higher the 
rate of relief under the present rules would remain at 40% with no PRT 
relief, because all the costs were set against PRT income taxed at 0% 
rate.  All the costs were still clawed back and set against income 
generated from 2016 onwards. 
 
Field No.7:  500 mmbbls:  Low Cost:  $40 future price 
In this scenario the economic limit is reached in 2023.  PRT paid is £925 
million at 1991 prices.  Total relief for decommissioning remains at 
40% (CT 30% and SC 10%).  All the costs are set against PRT income 
generated from 2016 onwards when the rate is 0%.   
 
Field No.7:  500 mmbbls:  Low Cost:  $60 future price 
In this scenario the economic limit is reached in 2024.  PRT paid is 
again £925 million at 1991 prices.  Decommissioning relief remains 
overall at 40% with no relief being available for PRT as all the costs are 
set against PRT income at the rate of 0%.   
 
Field No.8:  500 mmbbls:  Medium Cost:  $50 future oil price 
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In this scenario accumulated production is 503 mmbbls with COP in 
2023.  Much less PRT is paid on this field (£262 million) compared to 
the low cost case, but there is no relief for this tax as the costs are all 
recovered against income subject to 0% rate.  Relief for CT and SC 
combined is at 40%.  Again, increases in the decommissioning costs 
would not change the rate of relief.   
 
In this case if PRT had been abolished and a DRD were in place the 
overall decommissioning relief would have been 65%, consisting of 
PRT at 50%, CT 30%, and SC 10% minus the CT and SC paid on PRT 
refunds. 
 
Field No.8:  500 mmbbls:  Medium Cost:  $40 future oil price 
In this case there is still no relief for PRT although net payments of this 
tax are made.  Decommissioning costs are clawed back but are set 
against income taxed at 0%.  Relief for CT is at 30% and for SC at 10% 
 
Field No.8:  500 mmbbls:  Medium Cost:  $60 future price 
PRT of £262 million is paid on this field but there is no PRT 
decommissioning relief.  The costs are clawed back and set against 
income taxed at 0%.  Relief for CT is obtained at 30% and for SC at 
10%.   
 
Field No.9:  500 mmbbls:  High Cost:  $50 future oil price 
In this case accumulated production is 500 mmbbls and COP is reached 
in 2022.  No PRT is paid on the field because of the high costs.  There 
is thus no PRT relief.  The losses were clawed back and set against 
income subject to PRT at 0%.  Relief for CT is at 30% and at 10% for 
SC.   
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Field No.9:  500 mmbbls:  High Cost:  $40 future price 
In this case no PRT was paid on the field because of the high costs.  
Decommissioning costs were set against income taxed at 0%.  Relief 
for CT at 30% and SC at 10% are obtained.   
 
Field No.9:  500 mmbbls:  High Cost:  $60 future price 
In this case PRT is still not paid because of the high costs.  No PRT 
relief for decommissioning is received.  The costs were set against 
income taxed at 0%.  Relief for CT at 30% and SC at 10% are obtained.   
 
B. Old (1991) Fields plus Incremental Investments 
In this section the results of the interaction of the tax system relating to 
decommissioning with the introduction of an incremental investment in 
later field life are examined. 
 
Field No.10:  50 mmbbls:  Medium Cost Plus Incremental Investment 
with Reserves of c.10 mmbbls:  Starting in 2004:  Incremental Devex 
of $12/boe and Incremental Opex of $8.8/boe:  $50 future oil price 
The effect of the incremental project is to postpone the economic limit 
from 2010 to 2014.  Total economic recovery is increased from 50.5 
mmbbls to 60.5 mmbbls.  The post-tax NPV@10% (1991 base) is 
increased by nearly £9m.  Decommissioning relief is at 50% which is 
the same as for the field without the incremental project.  No PRT is 
paid on the total field and the oil allowance was not fully used.  But the 
extra revenues permitted more of the oil allowance to be utilised and 
less of it was displaced by decommissioning losses.  The investment 
took place too early to be eligible for the Investment Allowance for SC 
and the costs were too low to obtain a Brownfield Allowance.  Relief at 
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30% is obtained for CT and at 20% for SC.  This is the same as for the 
field excluding the incremental project. 
 
Field No.11:  50 mmbbls:  Medium Cost Plus Incremental Project of c. 
20 mmbbls starting in 2004:  $50 future oil price 
In this case the incremental project has reserves of c. 20 mmbbls.  The 
economic life of the whole field is extended from 2010 to 2017.  The 
post-tax NPV@10% is increased by £15.13m.  No PRT is paid and the 
oil allowance is not fully utilised.  But the extra revenues permitted 
more of the oil allowance to be utilised and less of it was displaced by 
decommissioning losses.  There is no effective PRT relief for the 
decommissioning costs.  They are set against income subject to the 0% 
rate, and subsequently they displace some of the oil allowance.  For SC 
there is no Investment Allowance available and the level of the 
incremental costs was too low to obtain the Brownfield Allowance.  In 
this case decommissioning relief is at 30% for CT and 10% for SC.  The 
relief for SC is thus at a lower rate compared to the case without the 
incremental project when it was 20%, and compared to the smaller (10 
mmbbls) incremental project, because decommissioning takes place at 
a later date.  Thus, although the whole field post-tax NPV is increased 
by the incremental investment, the increase is reduced because of the 
decreased decommissioning relief. 
 
Field No.12:  50 mmbbls:  Medium Cost Plus Incremental Project of c. 
30 mmbbls starting in 2004:  $50 future oil price 
With this larger incremental project of c. 30 mmbbls the economic limit 
of the field is extended to 2019 with cumulative production being 80.5 
mmbbls.  The aggregate post-tax NPV@10% is increased by over 
£21m.  No PRT is paid on the whole field and it remains unable to utilise 
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all its oil allowance.  But the extra revenues permitted more of the oil 
allowance to be utilised and less of it was displaced by 
decommissioning losses.  No relief is available for PRT as the losses 
are set against income when the rate is 0%.  Full relief at 30% is 
obtained for CT.  For SC no Investment Allowance was available for 
the incremental project and the costs were too low to obtain the 
Brownfield Allowance.  Relief for SC for the whole field is at 10%.  
The total relief is thus 40%, while for the field without the incremental 
project it was 50%.  The extended life of the whole field brought this 
result.  Thus, although the whole field post-tax NPV is increased by the 
incremental investment, the increase is reduced because of the 
decreased decommissioning relief. 
 
Field No.13:  200 mmbbls:  Medium Cost Plus Incremental Investment 
of c. 30 bbls starting in 2012:  Devex for Incremental Project $14/bbl:  
$50 future oil price 
In this case the larger incremental project extends the economic limit 
from 2017 to 2027.  Total recovery is increased from 200 mmbbls to 
233.8 mmbbls.  The effect of the incremental project is to increase the 
post-tax NPV@10% by over £25m.  While PRT of £41 million was paid 
on the field there is no effective decommissioning relief for PRT 
because the losses are all set against income taxed at 0%.  But the extra 
revenues permitted more of the oil allowance to be utilised and less of 
it was displaced by decommissioning losses.  For CT full relief at 30% 
is achieved.  For SC the project obtained the full benefit of the 
Brownfield Allowance.  Relief for SC is at 10% with no displacement 
of this allowance.  However, in the absence of the incremental project 
total effective relief was at 56% because it was obtained at a higher SC 
rate and included some PRT relief.  Thus, although the incremental 
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project increases the whole field post-tax NPV, by extending total field 
life, the increase is reduced by the decreased decommissioning relief. 
 
Field No.14:  200 mmbbls:  Medium Cost Plus Large Incremental 
Project of c. 50 mmbbls starting in 2012:  $50 future oil price 
In this case the whole field economic limit was extended from 2017 to 
2030.  Cumulative recovery becomes 253.8 mmbbls.  The post-tax 
NPV@10% is increased by over £34m.  PRT of £23.8 million at 1991 
prices was paid before decommissioning.  Decommissioning losses are 
clawed back against PRT income taxed at 0%.  For CT relief is at 30%.  
For SC the incremental project qualifies for the Brownfield Allowance 
and receives the benefits.  SC relief for decommissioning is at 10%.  
Excluding the incremental project relief for SC was at 13.4% and for 
PRT it was 27.4% due to the earlier COP date and higher rates of SC 
and PRT.  Thus, although the overall field post-tax NPV is increased by 
the incremental project, the increase is reduced by the decreased 
decommissioning relief from 56% to 40%. 
 
Field No.15:  200 mmbbls:  Medium Cost Plus Very Large Incremental 
Project of c. 70 mmbbls starting in 2012:  $50 future oil price 
In this case the whole field economic limit was extended from 2017 to 
2032.  The post-tax NPV@10% is increased by almost £42m.  When 
the incremental reserves are included the whole field can use its PRT 
oil allowance but a proportion comes after 2015 when PRT is at 0%.  
But the extra revenues permitted more of the oil allowance to be utilised 
and none of it was displaced by decommissioning losses.  
Decommissioning costs are clawed back but no effective PRT is 
received because the 0% rate applied to all the relevant years.  Relief at 
30% is obtained for CT.  For SC the Brownfield Allowance is available 
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and is used up by 2020.  SC relief is thus at 10%.  The total relief of 
40% compares with 56% in the absence of the incremental project.  
Thus, although the whole field post-tax NPV is increased by the 
incremental project, the decrease in decommissioning relief reduces this 
increase.  The earlier COP date in the absence of the incremental project 
meant that some relief for PRT was obtained and a higher rate of relief 
for the SC. 
 
Field No.16:  500 mmbbls:  Medium Cost with Large Incremental 
Project of c. 50 mmbbls starting in 2016 with Devex of $12 per bbl:  
$50 future oil price 
In this case the economic limit is extended from 2023 to 2034 and the 
accumulated production is increased to 553 million bbls.  The post-tax 
NPV@10% is increased by £28.53m.  PRT paid on the field before 
decommissioning is £262 million.  The whole field now uses all its PRT 
oil allowance.  Decommissioning relief for PRT is at 0% because that 
is the rate applicable when losses are clawed back.  For CT relief is 
obtained at 30%.  For SC the Investment Allowance is available and is 
fully used.  Relief for decommissioning at 10% is still fully available.  
In the absence of the incremental project decommissioning relief was 
also at 40%. 
 
Field No.17:  500 mmbbls:  Medium Cost with Large Incremental 
Project (c. 70 mmbbls) starting in 2016:  $50 future oil price 
In this case the economic limit of the field plus increment is 2036 
compared to 2023 without the extra project.  Accumulated production 
at the economic limit is 573 mmbbls.  The post-tax NPV@10% is 
increased by £37.2m. as a consequence of the incremental project.  PRT 
paid on the field before decommissioning is £262 million.  The whole 
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field uses all its oil allowance for PRT.  Decommissioning losses obtain 
no relief for PRT because of the 0% rate.  For CT relief is obtained at 
30%.  For SC the Investment Allowance is available and fully used.  
Decommissioning losses are relieved at 10% and there is no overlap 
with the Investment Allowance.  Without the incremental project relief 
was also at 40%. 
 
If PRT had been abolished rather than set at 0% rate and a DRD were 
in place the overall rate of relief would have increased from 40% to 
66% as there would have been relief for PRT. 
 
Field No.18:  500 mmbbls:  Medium Cost with Very Large Incremental 
Project (c.100 mmbbls): First Devex 2016:  $50 future oil price 
In this case the very large incremental project extends the life of the 
whole field from 2023 to 2036.  Accumulated total production is 603 
mmbbls.  The post-tax NPV@10% is increased by £50m.  PRT of £262 
million is paid before the reduction to 0% rate in 2016.  There is no 
effective PRT relief for decommissioning as the losses are clawed back 
into time periods when the rate is 0%.  CT relief at 30% is obtained.  
For SC the Investment Allowance is obtained and fully utilised.  Relief 
for decommissioning is at 10% obtained in time periods after the 
allowance has been utilised.  Without the incremental project relief was 
also at 40%. 
 
It is again noteworthy that, if PRT had been abolished and a DRD were 
in place, the effective relief for decommissioning would have been 
higher at 66% including some PRT relief. 
  
C. New Fields Developed from 2016 
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In this section the economic and tax aspects of the decommissioning of 
a set of new fields developed from 2016 are examined.  Financial values 
are to base year 2016.  The investor is again assumed not to have tax 
shelter from other field income. 
 
Field No.19:  20 mmbbls:  Low Cost with Devex of $10/bbl and Opex 
$9.72/bbl (2016 value):  $50 oil price 
In this case the field reaches its economic limit in 2031 when 
accumulated production attains 21.1 mmbbls.  The RFES is available 
and used.  Full relief for CT at 30% is obtained.  For SC the Investment 
Allowance is available and utilised.  Relief at 10% for decommissioning 
is obtained.   
 
Field No.20:  20 mmbbls:  Medium Cost with Devex of $18/bbl and 
Opex $15.9/bbl:  $50 oil price 
In this case the economic limit is reached in 2030.  Cumulative 
production is 20.7 mmbbls.  The field costs plus RFES benefits are 
received.  For SC the benefits of the Investment Allowance are received 
to the extent of 93% before decommissioning.  For CT relief is obtained 
at 30%.  For SC there is considerable displacement of the Investment 
Allowance by the decommissioning losses clawed back.  The net result 
is that the total relief is at the rate of 32.5%.   
 
Field No.21:  20 mmbbls:  High Cost with Devex $26/bbl and Opex 
$20.9/bbl:  $50 oil price 
In this case, in the unlikely event that the field were developed, the costs 
are recovered but only 23% of the eligible RFES benefits and none of 
the benefits of the Investment Allowance are received.  No CT nor SC 
are paid and there is no decommissioning relief. 
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Field No.21:  20 mmbbls:  High Cost:  $60 oil price 
In this case the field costs are recovered and the RFES benefits are 
received but only 13% of the Investment Allowance can be used before 
decommissioning.  Decommissioning relief is at the rate of 27.5% 
overall with incomplete relief for CT as well as SC due to insufficient 
taxable income, and, for the SC, displacement of all the available 
Investment Allowance. 
 
Field No.22:  50 mmbbls:  Low Cost with Devex $10/bbl and Opex 
$10.16/bbl:  $50 oil price 
In this case the economic limit is reached in 2035 when 50 mmbbls have 
been recovered.  There is full recovery of costs plus RFES benefits plus 
all the Investment Allowance for SC.  Decommissioning relief is at 40% 
with full relief for both CT and SC. 
 
These findings are repeated in the cases with future oil prices of $40 
and $60 in real terms. 
 
Field No.23:  50 mmbbls:  Medium Cost with Devex $17/bbl and Opex 
$17.28/bbl:  $50 oil price 
In this case the costs are recovered and all the RFES benefits received.  
But only 87% of the Investment Allowance before decommissioning 
can be utilised.  Decommissioning relief at 30% is achieved for CT but 
there is some displacement of the Investment Allowance for SC giving 
an overall rate of 32.4%.   
 
For this field at the $40 oil price the field costs are deducted in full but 
only 58% of the RFES benefits are utilised and none of the Investment 
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Allowance for SC even before decommissioning.  There is no 
decommissioning relief for CT nor SC.  None was paid.  At the $60 oil 
price all costs are deducted plus the RFES benefits and the Investment 
Allowance.  In this case full relief for decommissioning costs at 40% is 
obtained. 
 
Field No.24:  50 mmbbls:  High Cost with Devex $25/bbl and Opex 
$21.4/bbl:  $50 oil price 
In this case, while costs are deducted, only 21% of the potential RFES 
benefits are realised and none of the Investment Allowance (before 
decommissioning).  There is no decommissioning relief.  No CT nor SC 
are paid.  The field is non-viable. 
 
On this field at the $60 price the field costs are deducted and the full 
benefits of the RFES are received.  But only 1% of the Investment 
Allowance is utilised before decommissioning.  Only a very small 
amount of CT is payable and decommissioning relief is greatly 
constrained to 1.5% in total. 
 
Field No.25:  100 mmbbls:  Low Cost with Devex of $10/bbl and Opex 
$10.4/bbl:  $50 oil price 
In this case total recovery is 102.9 mmbbls with COP in 2039.  All costs 
are deducted, and the full benefits of the RFES and Investment 
Allowance are received before decommissioning.  Full relief for 
decommissioning costs at 40% is obtained.   
 
At the $40 price all costs are deducted and the full benefits of the RFES 
and Investment Allowance are received.  Full relief for 
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decommissioning costs at 40% is obtained.  At the $60 price there is a 
similar pattern of results. 
 
Field No.26:  100 mmbbls:  Medium Cost with Devex $17/bbl and 
Opex $17.6/bbl:  $50 oil price 
In this case all field costs are deducted and all the RFES benefits are 
received, but only 98% of the Investment Allowance before 
decommissioning.  For CT decommissioning relief is fully available at 
30% but for SC there is substantial displacement of the Investment 
Allowance from 98% to 77%.  The net result is that overall relief is 
32.2%.   
 
At the $40 price the field costs are deducted but only 58% of the RFES 
benefits are received and no Investment Allowance before 
decommissioning.  There is no tax paid and thus no decommissioning 
relief.   
 
At the $60 price all the field costs are deducted, and the full benefits of 
the RFES and Investment Allowance are received.  Decommissioning 
relief is available in full at the combined rate of 40%. 
 
Field No.27:  100 mmbbls:  High Cost with Devex $24/bbl and Opex 
$22.7/bbl:  $50 oil price 
In this case the field costs are deducted but only 21% of the potential 
RFES benefits are received and none of the Investment Allowance.  No 
CT nor SC are paid and there is no decommissioning relief.  The field 
is non-viable. 
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With the $40 oil price only 85% of the costs are deducted with no RFES 
benefits and no Investment Allowance being attained.  There is no 
decommissioning relief.  With the $60 price the field costs are deducted 
and all the potential RFES benefits are received.  But only 22% of the 
Investment Allowance can be utilised before decommissioning.  
Decommissioning relief for CT is available at 30% but for SC there is 
a substantial displacement of the Investment Allowance exceeding 
£211m.  The result is that overall effective relief is at 32.8%.   
 
D. New Fields plus Incremental Investments 
Field No.28:  20 mmbbls:  Medium Cost Plus Incremental Project of 5 
mmbbls with First Devex in 2026:  Low Cost with Devex $20/bbl and 
Opex $11.9 bbl:  $50 oil price 
In this case the economic limit is reached in 2032.  All the field plus 
incremental project costs are deducted.  All RFES benefits are received.  
Investment Allowances for the field and increment are utilised before 
decommissioning only to the extent of 98%.  Relief for 
decommissioning is at 31.8% (similar to that for the field excluding the 
incremental project) due to substantial displacement of the Investment 
Allowance for SC.  But the incremental revenues result in less of the 
Investment Allowance being displaced.  The incremental project 
increases the post-tax NPV@10% by £9.72m. 
 
With $40 price the field and incremental project costs are deductible 
and 88% of the RFES benefits are obtained.  But none of the Investment 
Allowances for SC before decommissioning are obtainable.  No tax is 
paid and there is no decommissioning relief.  The post-tax NPV for the 
field and project combined are improved but show negative values. 
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With $60 oil price all field and project costs are deducted and full RFES 
benefits and Investment Allowance are obtained.  Full 
decommissioning relief at 40% is obtained.  The post-tax NPV@10% 
for the whole field is significantly enhanced by the incremental project. 
 
Field No.29:  20 mmbbls:  Medium Cost Plus 10 mmbbls Incremental 
Project Starting 2026 with Devex $20/bbl and Opex $15.6/bbl:  $50 oil 
price 
In this case the economic limit is reached in 2036.  The mother field and 
incremental costs are deducted.  Full RFES benefits are received and 
97% of the Investment Allowances for SC.  Decommissioning relief for 
CT and SC is obtained at 32.3% (similar to that for the field excluding 
the incremental project) due to a significant displacement of the 
Investment Allowance.  But the incremental revenues result in less of 
the Investment Allowance being displaced.  The post-tax NPV@10% 
for the whole field is significantly enhanced by the incremental project. 
 
At $40 price the field and project costs are deducted.  Ninety-eight per 
cent of the RFES benefits are received, but none of the Investment 
Allowances before decommissioning relief.  No tax is paid and there is 
no decommissioning relief. 
 
At $60 oil price all the field and project costs are deducted.  Full benefits 
of the RFES and Investment Allowances are obtained.  Full 
decommissioning relief at 40% is obtained.  The incremental project 
significantly enhances the post-tax NPV@10% for the whole field. 
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Field No.30:  20 mmbbls:  Medium Cost Plus 12 mmbbls Incremental 
Project Starting in 2026 with Devex $20/bbl and Opex $15.8/bbl:  $50 
oil price 
In this case the economic limit is reached in 2037.  All the field costs 
are deducted.  The full benefits of the RFES and 97% of the Investment 
Allowances are obtained.  Decommissioning relief for CT and SC is at 
a combined rate of 32.1% (similar to that for the field excluding the 
incremental project) with some displacement of the Investment 
Allowance.  But the incremental revenues result in less of the 
Investment Allowance being displaced. 
 
At $40 oil price, while costs are deducted and RFES benefits are 
received, only 1% of the Investment Allowances before 
decommissioning are obtained.  Only a tiny amount of CT is paid.  
Effective decommissioning relief is at 4% due to the lack of taxable 
income. 
 
At $60 oil price the full costs are deducted, all RFES benefits are 
received, and the Investment Allowances are fully utilised.  
Decommissioning relief for CT and SC at a combined rate of 40% is 
received.  The incremental project adds significantly to the overall post-
tax NPV@10% of the whole field. 
 
Field No.31:  50 mmbbls field:  Medium Cost with Incremental Project 
of 10 mmbbls Starting in 2026 with Devex $20/bbl and Opex $15.6/bbl:  
$50 oil price 
The economic limit for this field plus project is reached in 2036.  All 
the field and project costs are deducted.  The full RFES benefits and 
86% of the Investment Allowances are received before 
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decommissioning.  Decommissioning relief at the combined rate of 
32.2% (similar to that for the field excluding the incremental project) is 
obtained with some displacement of the Investment Allowance.  But the 
incremental revenues result in less of the Investment Allowance being 
displaced.  The incremental project still adds significantly to the post-
tax NPV of the whole filed. 
 
At $40 price the field and project costs are deducted, but only 65% of 
the RFES benefits and none of the Investment Allowance before 
decommissioning are obtained.  No CT and no SC are paid and no 
decommissioning relief is obtained. 
 
At $60 price all the field and project costs are deducted and the full 
benefits of the RFES and Investment Allowance are received.  
Decommissioning relief is at 40%.  The incremental project adds 
significantly to the post-tax NPV@10% of the whole field. 
 
Field No.32:  50 mmbbls:  Medium Cost with 20 mmbbls Incremental 
Project Starting in 2026 with Devex $20/bbl and Opex $15.6/bbl:  $50 
oil price 
In this case the economic limit is reached in 2039.  The field and project 
costs are fully deducted and all the benefits of the RFES are received.  
But only 91% of the Investment Allowances are received.  
Decommissioning relief at 32.6% (similar to that for the field excluding 
the incremental project) is obtained with significant displacement of the 
Investment Allowance.  But the incremental revenues result in less of 
the Investment Allowance being displaced.  The incremental project 
adds significantly to the post-tax NPV@10% of the whole field. 
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At the $40 price the field and project costs are deducted but only 75% 
of the benefits of the RFES are obtained.  None of the Investment 
Allowance benefits are obtained before decommissioning.  No tax is 
paid and no decommissioning relief is received. 
 
At the $60 price all costs are deducted and the full benefits of the RFES 
and Investment Allowance are obtained.  Decommissioning relief is at 
40%. 
 
Field No.33:  50 mmbbls:  Medium Cost with 30 mmbbls Incremental 
Project Starting in 2026 with Devex $20 per bbl and Opex $15.48/bbl:  
$50 oil price 
In this case the economic limit is reached in 2041.  All the field and 
project costs are deducted and all the benefits of the RFES are received, 
but only 95% of the Investment Allowances.  Decommissioning relief 
is at 32.2% (similar to that for the field excluding the incremental 
project) with some displacement of the Investment Allowance.  But the 
incremental revenues result in less of the Investment Allowance being 
displaced.  The project adds significantly to the post-tax NPV@10% for 
the whole field. 
 
At the $40 price all the costs of the field and project are deducted, and 
89% of the RFES benefits are obtained, but none of the Investment 
Allowances are utilised before decommissioning.  No tax is paid and 
there is no decommissioning relief. 
 
At $60 price all the costs are deducted and the full benefits of the RFES 
and Investment Allowance received.  Decommissioning relief is at 
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40%.  The incremental project makes a major contribution to the post-
tax NPV@10% of the whole field. 
 
Field No. 34:  100 mmbbls:  Medium Cost with 30 mmbbls Incremental 
Project Starting in 2026 with Devex $20/bbl and Opex $15.48/bbl:  $50 
oil price 
In this case the economic limit is reached in 2041.  All the field and 
project costs are deducted and all the benefits of the RFES and 
Investment Allowance are received before decommissioning.  
Decommissioning relief at 33.7% is obtained.  There is some 
displacement of the Investment Allowance.  But the incremental 
revenues result in less of the Investment Allowance being displaced.  
The incremental project makes a significant contribution to the post-tax 
NPV@10% of the whole field. 
 
At the $40 price all the field and project costs are deducted, but only 
75% of the benefit of the RFES are obtained, and none of the Investment 
Allowance before decommissioning.  No tax is paid and there is no 
decommissioning relief.   
 
At the $60 price all field and project costs are deducted and the full 
benefits of the RFES and Investment Allowance are received.  
Decommissioning relief is at 40%.  The incremental project makes a 
substantial contribution to the post-tax NPV@10% of the whole field. 
 
Field No. 35:  100 mmbbls:  Medium Cost with 50 mmbbls Incremental 
Project Starting in 2026 with Devex $20/bbl and Opex $15.28/bbl:  $50 
oil price 
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In this case the economic limit is reached in 2044.  All the field and 
project costs are deducted and the full benefits of the RFES and 
Investment Allowance are received before decommissioning.  
Decommissioning relief is at 36.6% (compared to 32.2% for the field 
excluding the project) with a small displacement of the Investment 
Allowance.  But the incremental revenues result in less of the 
Investment Allowance being displaced.  The project makes a major 
contribution to the post-tax NPV@10% of the while field. 
 
At the $40 oil price the field and project costs are deducted, and 91% of 
the RFES benefits are received.  But none of the Investment Allowances 
are obtained before decommissioning.  No tax is paid and there is no 
decommissioning relief5. 
 
At $60 price all the field and project costs are deducted and all the RFES 
and Investment Allowance benefits are received.  Decommissioning 
relief is at 40%.  The incremental project makes a major contribution to 
the post-tax NPV@10% for the whole field. 
 
Field No. 36:  100 mmbbls:  Medium Cost with Incremental Project of 
70 mmbbls Starting in 2026 with Devex $20/bbl and Opex $15.52 bbl:  
$50 oil price 
In this case the economic limit is reached in 2046.  All the field and 
project costs are deducted, all the benefits of the RFES are received, 
and all of the Investment Allowances before decommissioning.  
Decommissioning relief is obtained at 38.8% (compared to 32.2% for 
the field without the project) with relief for SC being reduced because 
of a small displacement of the Investment Allowance.  But the large 
incremental revenues result in less of the Investment Allowance being 
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displaced compared to the position without the incremental project.  
The project makes a modest contribution to the NPV@10% for the 
whole field.  
 
At the $40 price all the field and project costs are deducted and all the 
RFES benefits are received but only 5% of the Investment Allowances 
before decommissioning.  Decommissioning relief is at only 13.3%.  
CT relief is only at 12.1% because of lack of taxable income.  The relief 
for SC is very minor because of lack of taxable income and 
displacement of the Investment Allowance. 
 
At the $60 price all costs are deducted and all benefits from the RFES 
and Investment Allowance are received.  Decommissioning relief is at 
40%.  The project makes a major contribution to the post-tax 
NPV@10% for the whole field. 
 
Detailed comparative charts showing decommissioning relief for all the 
fields in relation to prices, unit costs, and vintages of development and 
COP are shown in the Appendix. 
 
E. Comparison of Investors Currently in Full Tax-Paying Position 
and those without Tax Shelter:  A Case Study 
The effectiveness of relief available to investors in oil and gas fields 
depends on several factors as has been highlighted above.  Their current 
tax-paying position is an important factor.  The analysis above has 
concentrated on the position of investors who are not currently able to 
obtain relief for expenditures against income from other fields.  But 
some investors may be able to obtain tax shelter against other income 
from the UKCS.  Potentially the difference between the extent of 
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effective reliefs is significant.  In this section the results of a detailed 
analysis is reported which measure these differences. 
 
For this purpose the 20 million bbls field was chosen as being 
representative of the size of new fields in the UKCS.  The analysis was 
conducted under the same low cost, medium cost, and high cost 
assumptions as employed in Section C.  Similarly, oil prices of $40, $50 
and $60 in real terms were employed.  The investor currently in a tax-
paying position obtains early relief for his initial investment against 
income from other fields in the form of the capital allowances for CT 
and SC.  The Investment Allowance for SC is, however, constrained to 
the income from the new field.  Decommissioning relief is obtained 
against the income from other fields.  The effects of the difference in 
tax treatment are shown in terms of post-tax NPVs, rates of utilisation 
of the Investment Allowance, and rates of effective decommissioning 
relief. 
 
In Table 1 these comparative effects are shown under the low cost and 
$50 price assumptions. 
Table 1 
Comparative Effects of Different Investor Tax Positions on Low Cost, 
20 mmbbls field, $50 price 
 
 Project Investor Full Tax-Paying 
Investor 
NPV@10% (£m. 2016) 130.0 133.1 
NPV/I@10% 1.01 1.03 
Investment Allowance used:   
a) pre-decommissioning 100% 100% 
b) post-decommissioning 100% 100% 
Effective decommissioning 
relief  
40% 40% 
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In this case there is no difference in the rates of decommissioning relief 
nor of the utilisation of the Investment Allowance.  The NPV is higher 
for the investor already in a tax-paying position because of the earlier 
relief for investment costs which, at the 10% real discount rate, is more 
valuable than the loss of the RFES which employs a discount rate of 
10% in MOD terms.  The cash flow to the investor is higher using the 
RFES allowance at low discount rates.  It should be emphasised that the 
case in Table 1 reflects very low investment costs for the field ($10/bbl 
in real terms). 
 
The above findings were repeated in the $40 and $60 oil price cases and 
are not shown here. 
 
In Table 2 the results are shown for the medium cost case (investment 
cost of $18/bbl) at the $50 price.  It is seen that there is a major 
difference in the post-tax position of the investors.  The project investor 
receives decommissioning relief at 32.5%, involving significant 
displacement of the Investment Allowance.  He was also unable to 
utilise all his Investment Allowance before decommissioning.  The full 
tax-paying investor obtains decommissioning relief at 40% and was 
able to utilise all his Investment Allowance because of his ability to 
obtain relief for his field investment against other income and thus not 
have to rely on the RFES.  The increase in NPV is significant and 
emanates from the early relief for the initial field investment. 
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Table 2 
Comparative Effects of Different Investor Tax Positions on Medium Cost, 
20 mmbbls field, $50 price 
 
 Project Investor Full Tax-Paying 
Investor 
NPV@10% (£m. 2016) 32.4 40.8 
NPV/I@10% 0.14 0.18 
Investment Allowance used:   
a) pre-decommissioning 93% 100% 
b) post-decommissioning 76% 100% 
Effective decommissioning 
relief 
32.5% 40% 
 
In Table 3 the results are shown for the medium cost case with $40 oil 
price.  The NPVs are negative for both investors, but it is seen that there 
is a major improvement when the investor is in a full tax-paying 
position.  The project investor is unable to utilise his Investment 
Allowance at all, given that he is using the RFES and income is very 
constrained at this oil price.  The investor who obtains tax relief for his 
initial investment against other income is able to utilise the Investment 
Allowance and, of course, obtains relief for decommissioning against 
other income. 
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Table 3 
Comparative Effects of Different Investor Tax Positions on Medium Cost, 
20 mmbbls field, $40 price 
 
 Project Investor Full Tax-Paying 
Investor 
NPV@10% (£m. 2016) - 33 -10.7 
NPV/I@10% - 0.14 -0.05 
Investment Allowance used:   
a) pre-decommissioning 0% 100% 
b) post-decommissioning 0% 100% 
Effective decommissioning 
relief 
0% 40% 
 
Table 4 
Comparative Effects of Different Investor Tax Positions on Medium Cost, 
20 mmbbls field, $60 price 
 
 Project Investor Full Tax-Paying 
Investor 
NPV@10% (£m. 2016) 85.5 92.2 
NPV/I@10% 0.37 0.40 
Investment Allowance used:   
a) pre-decommissioning 100% 100% 
b) post-decommissioning 100% 100% 
Effective decommissioning 
relief 
40% 40% 
 
In Table 4 the results are shown for the medium cost field with $60 oil 
price.  It is seen that the difference in post-tax NPVs is not very marked.  
Full relief is available to the project investor for decommissioning as is 
full utilisation of the Investment Allowance before decommissioning. 
 
In Table 5 the results are shown for the high cost field (investment costs 
of $26/bbl) at the $50 oil price.  It is seen that the field is not 
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commercially viable but the returns are significantly improved for the 
investor in a tax-paying position.  He is able to set his capital allowances 
against income from other fields and still have sufficient income 
available to utilise his Investment Allowance.  He also obtains full relief 
for decommissioning costs.  The project investor does not have enough 
income available after using the RFES to utilise the Investment 
Allowance, and obtains no tax relief for the decommissioning costs. 
 
Table 5 
Comparative Effects of Different Investor Tax Positions on High Cost, 
20 mmbbls field, $50 price 
 
 Project Investor Full Tax-Paying 
Investor 
NPV@10% (£m. 2016) - 95.5  - 44.7 
NPV/I@10% - 0.28 - 0.13 
Investment Allowance used:   
a) pre-decommissioning 0% 100% 
b) post-decommissioning 0% 100% 
Effective decommissioning 
relief 
0% 40% 
 
Table 6 
Comparative Effects of Different Investor Tax Positions on Medium Cost, 
20 mmbbls field, $40 price 
 
 Project Investor Full Tax-Paying 
Investor 
NPV@10% (£m. 2016) - 178.8 - 96.4 
NPV/I@10% - 0.53 - 0.29 
Investment Allowance used:   
a) pre-decommissioning 0% 100% 
b) post-decommissioning 0% 100% 
Effective decommissioning 
relief 
0% 40% 
 
37 
 
In Table 6 the comparative positions of the two investors are shown 
under high cost conditions with $40 oil price.  The investment is clearly 
not viable after tax, but it is seen that the returns to the investor in a tax-
paying position are significantly higher.  He is able to obtain early relief 
for his initial investment costs and still utilise the Investment Allowance 
and obtain full relief for decommissioning.  The project investor obtains 
no relief for decommissioning and cannot utilise his Investment 
Allowance. 
 
Table 7 
Comparative Effects of Different Investor Tax Positions on High Cost, 
20 mmbbls field, $60 price 
 
 Project Investor Full Tax-Paying 
Investor 
NPV@10% (£m. 2016) - 11.2 7.3 
NPV/I@10% - 0.03 0.02 
Investment Allowance used:   
a) pre-decommissioning 13% 100% 
b) post-decommissioning 0% 100% 
Effective decommissioning 
relief  
27.5% 40% 
 
In Table 7 the results for the high cost field at $60 price are shown.  The 
post-tax NPV@10% is seen to be negative for the project investor and 
positive for the investor in a full tax-paying position.  The project 
investor obtains the RFES in full but can only utilise 13% of the 
Investment Allowance before decommissioning.  There is no 
decommissioning relief and the losses displace all of the available 
Investment Allowance.  The investor in a full tax-paying position not 
only utilises 100% of the Investment Allowance but also receives 
decommissioning relief at 40%. 
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There is a clear pattern to the results.  The lower the post-tax 
profitability of the investment project the greater the difference in post-
tax returns between the individual project investor and one who is in a 
full tax-paying position.  The former may not be able to utilise all his 
Investment Allowance before decommissioning and faces the prospect 
of being unable to obtain effective decommissioning relief because of 
inadequate income and/or displacement of the Investment Allowance.  
The full tax-paying investor can readily be assured of decommissioning 
relief and has a greater chance of being able to utilise all his Investment 
Allowance.  Correspondingly, when pre-tax profitability is high, the 
difference between the post-tax returns to the two types of investors 
becomes progressively less.  The likelihood that the project investor 
will be able to obtain effective decommissioning relief and utilise all 
his Investment Allowance increases. 
 
F. Relationship between Effective Tax Takes and Rates of 
Decommissioning Relief 
It was thought useful to compare the effective life time tax takes on the 
sets of representative fields with the rates of effective tax relief.  For 
this purpose the effective rate of tax take was measured before 
decommissioning relief.  For the old 1991 fields the modelling 
incorporates all the tax changes made since that base year.  In Chart 1 
the results are shown in nominal or MOD terms for the fields developed 
in the early 1990’s under all cost assumptions.  Future oil prices are $50 
in real terms.  Incremental projects developed are also included as extra 
cases and incorporated with the main field.  In many cases the effective 
rate of relief is 40% while the effective rate of tax is within the range 
42%-56%.  On the 200 mmbbls field the effective rate of relief is within 
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the range, and the effective rate of tax is within the range 53%-56%.  
On the other hand in the 50 mmbbls field the effective rate of relief is 
50% in all cases while the effective tax rate is within the range 42%-
49%.  This latter result reflects the various tax allowances, particularly 
for PRT, which historically helped smaller fields relatively more than 
larger ones.  Decommissioning relief for the 50 mmbbls field is also at 
a higher rate than for the 500 mmbbls cases because the former field 
reaches its economic limit earlier in time when tax rates for relieving 
decommissioning losses were higher than those from 2016 onwards. 
 
Chart 1 
 
 
In Chart 2 the results are shown in the case where future oil prices are 
$40 in real terms.  There is one noteworthy difference in the pattern of 
results.  The earlier attainment of the economic limit and the lower 
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future production revenues for the 200 mmbbls field results in a higher 
rate of relief because the losses are clawed back further into periods 
where the tax rates are higher.  At the same time effective tax rates are 
generally unchanged. 
 
Chart 2 
 
 
In Chart 3 the results are shown for the case where the future oil price 
is $60 in real term.  In this case the main difference from the results in 
Charts 1 and 2 is that the effective rates of relief for the 200 mmbbls 
field are lower.  This is because the production revenues are higher and 
the losses do not need to be clawed back so far into years when the tax 
rates were higher.  Effective tax rates on the whole field remain 
unchanged. 
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Chart 3 
 
 
Chart 4 
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In Chart 4 the tax takes and rates of decommissioning relief for the 1991 
fields are shown in real terms with future oil prices of $50.  This takes 
account of the considerable inflation which has occurred since then.  
The main difference compared to the findings in MOD terms is that, 
measured in real terms, tax takes in many cases are significantly higher, 
while decommissioning relief rates remain largely unchanged.  This 
finding is replicated in the case where future oil prices are $40 (Chart 
5) and in the case where they are $60 (Chart 6). 
 
Chart 5 
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Chart 6 
 
 
In Chart 7 effective tax rates and decommissioning relief rates in MOD 
terms are shown for the fields developed from 2016 where the oil price 
is $50 in real terms.  It is seen that in the majority of cases effective 
rates of relief are in the 32%-36% range along with effective tax rates 
in the 20%-30% range.  There are a few outlier observations reflecting 
situations of extremely low or substantial profitability. 
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Chart 7 
 
 
Chart 8 
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Under the $40 price case (Chart 8) extreme values were found with rates 
of effective tax and decommissioning along with relief at 0% being 
found.  Only in exceptional cases were tax rates in the 30%-35% range 
along with decommissioning relief at 40% found.  The investments are 
generally uneconomic. 
 
At the $60 price a high proportion of the observations have 
decommissioning relief at 40% along with effective tax takes in the 
30%-40% range (Chart 9).  There are still cases where profitability is 
very low and so observations were found where very low effective tax 
rates and rates of decommissioning relief were experienced.   
 
 
Chart 9 
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Tax takes and rates of decommissioning relief were also a calculated in 
real terms.  The results for the oil price cases of $50, $40, and $60 are 
shown in Charts 10, 11 and 12.  It is seen that they differ very little from 
those in MOD terms.  This is because of the low rates of future inflation 
assumed in the modelling.  This is in contrast to the experience of 
inflation in the historic period from 1991. 
 
Chart 10 
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Chart 11 
 
 
Chart 12 
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A comparison of the effective rates of tax and decommissioning relief 
was made between investors in a tax-paying position and those without 
tax shelter.  The results for the $50 price are shown in Chart 13.  
Investors in a full tax-paying position (termed ongoing in Chart 13) can 
obtain tax relief on their initial investment and for decommissioning 
against other income from the UKCS, and in normal circumstances 
would obtain decommissioning relief at 40%, whereas investors 
without tax shelter can have restricted relief due to inadequate income 
and/or displacement of the Investment Allowance.  Effective tax rates 
on the fields are generally in the range 18%-38% reflecting the reliefs 
against other field income and the Investment Allowance. 
 
 
Chart 13 
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In Chart 14 the results for the $40 price case are shown.  They are 
outliers in the sense that the investments are generally unprofitable and 
the negative rates of tax reflect relief against other income for investors 
with tax shelter as does the decommissioning relief. 
 
Chart 14 
 
 
In Chart 15 the results are shown for the $60 oil price.  In the majority 
of cases decommissioning relief is at 40% and the tax takes are in the 
30%-40% range. 
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Chart 15 
 
 
Chart 16 
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In Chart 16 the results are shown for the tax takes and decommissioning 
relief in real terms at the $50 price.  Rates of decommissioning relief 
are generally unchanged compared to the results in MOD terms, but 
effective tax takes for investments of very low profitability are lower 
for investors with tax shelter due to the advantage of early relief for the 
investments. 
 
Chart 17 
 
 
 
In Chart 17 the real tax takes and decommissioning relief are shown for 
the $40 price case.  The investments are mostly uneconomic and the 
low tax rates and rates of decommissioning relief reflect the tax 
advantages to investors with tax shelter. 
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Chart 18 
 
 
In Chart 18 the results are shown for the $60 price case.  In this case the 
pattern of results is very similar to those in MOD terms reflecting the 
higher profitability of the individual investments and the low inflation. 
 
5. Summary and Conclusions 
In this study the economic and taxation aspects of decommissioning fields 
in the UKCS have been examined.  The twin objectives have been (1) to 
calculate decommissioning relief in the different plausible circumstances, 
and thus to elucidate the complexities of the tax arrangements relating to 
the activity, and (2) to assess whether they are consistent with the objective 
of procuring maximum economic recovery from the province.  Thus 
incremental investments should not be discouraged and there should not be 
incentives via the tax system which could encourage the acceleration of 
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cessation of production (COP) compared to the pre-tax economic limit.  
Ineffective relief for decommissioning should also not adversely affect 
asset values in late field life and inhibit asset transactions which are 
otherwise desirable to promote maximum economic recovery. 
 
The study involved financial simulation modelling with a substantial 
number of representative oil fields in two main categories.  The first 
category relates to fields developed in the early 1990’s.  The fields were 
designed to represent a typical range of sizes and costs of that vintage.  The 
oil prices and inflation factors employed were those actually experienced 
in the historic period to 2015.  Future oil price scenarios of $40, $50, and 
$60 in real terms were employed.  The modelling incorporated all the 
complexities of the tax system, including PRT, CT and SC, and the many 
changes made since the early 1990’s.  The detailed tax arrangements for 
relief for decommissioning costs have been modified significantly over the 
years, and the modelling has incorporated all these changes.  The second 
set of representative fields relates to new ones with first development in 
2016.  Their sizes and costs reflect the current realities. 
 
For the two sets of fields representative incremental projects were also 
employed in the study.  They were presumed to be developed in the mature 
years of the lives of the fields.  The purpose was to discover how the tax 
reliefs relating to decommissioning would interact with the incremental 
projects and their associated allowances.  Again, the projects chosen were 
representative of the sizes and costs of the two vintages. 
 
The financial modelling calculated the pre-tax and post-tax returns to the 
fields and fields plus incremental projects with emphasis on NPVs.  The 
effective rates of relief for decommissioning and the effective rates of tax 
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on the fields were calculated and highlighted.  Sensitivity analysis was 
undertaken to enhance understanding of the effects of the taxation 
arrangements. 
 
On the old fields subject to PRT, CT, and SC it was found that the 50 
mmbbls field reached its COP date in 2010 when positive PRT rates still 
existed, but did not pay the tax because of a combination of the investment 
capital allowances and uplift, and the oil allowance.  There was no effective 
PRT relief because of the displacement of the oil allowance by the losses 
clawed back.  On the 50 mmbbls representative field the overall rate of 
relief was found to be 50%.  When incremental projects were introduced 
field life was extended into years when the PRT rate was 0%.  Effective 
rates of decommissioning relief then fell to 40% (CT at 30% and SC at 
10%).  The overall field NPV was still increased by the incremental project 
but the increase was reduced by the lower rate of decommissioning relief. 
 
The 200 mmbbls field has a COP date in the period 2017-2019 depending 
on cost and price assumptions.  With the medium cost and $50 future oil 
price overall decommissioning relief was found to be 56%.  Relief for PRT 
was held down not only by the 0% tax rate, but by some displacement of 
the oil allowance by the losses carried back.  It was also found that with a 
higher future price of $60 field life was extended in time but the rate of 
decommissioning relief fell to 53% because a larger part of the 
decommissioning losses were relieved at the 0% PRT rate from the bigger 
revenues.  Correspondingly, at the lower future oil price of $40 the COP 
date came earlier with the result that the rate of decommissioning relief 
was increased to 58% because a smaller part of the losses were relieved at 
the 0% rate, and greater amounts were relieved at the higher PRT rates. 
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When incremental projects were added to the 200 mmbbls field its overall 
life was extended to well beyond 2025 depending on the size of the project.  
This meant that all of the decommissioning losses were relieved at the 0% 
PRT rate.  Consequently the overall rate of relief fell to 40% (CT at 30% 
and SC at 10%), even though substantial PRT payments had been made.  
The incremental projects still added to the overall post-tax field NPV but 
the increase was reduced as a consequence of the lower rate of relief. 
 
The life of the large 500 mmbbls field extends well beyond 2025 depending 
on cost and oil price assumptions.  Large PRT payments are made from 
this field but all the decommissioning losses are relieved at the 0% rate 
with relief received being at 40%.  The additions of incremental projects 
extended overall field life and relief remained at 40%. 
 
The results indicate that the rates of relief were broadly inversely related 
to the length of life of the field when major changes to the tax were also 
taking place. 
 
On the new fields whose development stated in 2016 the expected rate of 
decommissioning relief is 40% with CT at 30% and SC at 10%.  However, 
it was found that with fields of 20, 50, and 100 mmbbls, with medium 
assumptions regarding investment and operating costs, at the $50 real price 
decommissioning losses displaced the Investment Allowance for SC to a 
significant effect.  On all 3 fields the effective rate of relief was reduced to 
32%-33%.  At the $60 real price the larger revenues ensured that relief was 
at 40% across all 3 fields. 
 
When incremental projects were added it was found that at the $50 real 
price the rate of effective relief in most cases did not change significantly.  
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There was displacement of the Investment Allowance but the extra 
revenues also extended field life.  When the size of the incremental project 
was substantial the extra revenues could mean that the displacement of the 
Investment Allowance was reduced.  The overall rate of relief was then 
found to increase to 36%-39%.  In all cases the incremental project added 
to the overall post-tax NPV. 
 
In all cases it was found that at the $60 price relief was at 40% when the 
incremental projects were added. 
 
Relief for CT and SC can be obtained against income from other fields 
rather than clawed back against taxable income in the field being 
decommissioned.  Currently many investors may not have such other 
income.  If they did they could obtain decommissioning relief at 40%.  This 
would often be higher than that available for the investor without other 
field income as indicated above.  On small fields it was also found that the 
investor with existing tax shelter could obtain more effective relief for his 
initial field investment than the investor who had no tax shelter at the time 
of the investment. 
 
In sum, this study has demonstrated that the effective rate of relief for 
decommissioning on both old and new fields can vary greatly depending 
on the interaction of the losses with other allowances and on whether the 
investor has tax shelter from income from other fields.  Effective relief was 
also found to depend on the size of the field in question, its costs, and the 
prevailing oil price.  Given the large costs of decommissioning this makes 
planning for the activity more difficult.  Investments in incremental 
projects can clearly interact with the attainment of effective relief.  The 
existence and prevalence of allowance displacement effects is an odd 
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feature of the current tax system, and it is not obvious that one legitimate 
allowance should be displaced by another.  The modelling found that 
generally incremental projects still added to the remaining NPVs and 
economic recovery, but in the current period of serious capital rationing it 
cannot be assumed that all such incremental projects would proceed.  In 
old, PRT fields it was also found that the addition of the incremental project 
reduced the effective rate of decommissioning relief for the whole field.  
This in effect reduced the size of the increase in the whole field NPV from 
the incremental project.  On new fields it was found that decommissioning 
relief was generally not reduced as a result of incremental projects. 
 
Decommissioning relief is an important subject in relation to late field life 
asset transactions.  Knowledge of the likely effective relief as discussed in 
this paper will affect the valuation of a mature asset to a material extent.  
Buyers will be anxious to discover what relief is available if they are to 
accept liability for the decommissioning activity.  Sellers can more readily 
get such tax relief as they have the tax history for CT and SC as well as 
PRT.  But they may not wish to retain the liability.  In such circumstances 
the idea that the tax history of the seller could be transferred to the buyer 
deserves serious consideration. 
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Appendix 
Chart A1 
 
 
The level of decommissioning relief is affected by the oil price for fields 
4, 5, 6 and 11.   For field 4, at $40 production is lower, and, as the oil price 
increases there is less SC relief clawed back into periods with higher rates 
of SC, and more PRT relief occurs in periods when the PRT rate is zero.    
For field 5 there is more production at $60.  At $60 there is no loss of oil 
allowance.  The loss is higher with the $40 price than with the $50 price.  
For field 5, as the oil price increases there is less SC relief clawed back into 
periods with higher rates of SC and more PRT relief occurs in periods when 
the PRT rate is zero.  
   
For field 6, there is less production at $40 and as the oil price increases the 
loss of oil allowance declines.   For field 6, as the oil price increases there 
is less SC relief clawed back into periods with higher rates of SC and more 
PRT relief occurs in periods when the PRT rate is zero.    
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For field 11, as the oil price increases there is less oil allowance lost, more 
PRT relief occurs in periods when the PRT rate is zero, and at $40 the rate 
of relief for SC is higher.   
 
Chart A2 
 
 
For fields 19, 22 and 25 the oil price has no effect on the rate of relief.  All 
receive 40% relief.  
   
At $40, fields 21, 24, 27 cannot recover their development costs so they 
pay no tax and fields 20, 23, 26, 28, 29, 31, 32, 33, 34 and 35 pay no CT 
or SC and cannot use all of the supplement.   Fields 30 and 36 lose IA on 
decommissioning. 
 
At $50, fields 21, 24 and 27 pay no CT or SC and cannot use all of the 
supplement.   Fields 20, 23, 26, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32 and 33 cannot use all of 
their IA even before decommissioning, and fields 34, 35 and 36 lose IA on 
decommissioning. 
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At $60, fields 21, 24 and 27 cannot use all of their IA even before 
decommissioning. 
 
Chart A3 
 
 
From Charts A3, A4 and A5 it is seen that even relatively low cost fields 
fail to gain decommissioning relief at more than 50%. 
The level of unit costs changes for a few fields with a change in the oil 
price (fields 4 and 6 have lower production at $40 and fields 5 and 7 have 
higher production at $60 and this changes the unit cost).  
 
The decommissioning relief may change with the oil price.  At $40, fields 
4, 5, 6 and 11 have higher decommissioning relief (for field 4, 5, 6 and 11 
there is more PRT relief before the PRT rate becomes zero).   At $60, fields 
4, 5, 6 have lower decommissioning relief because less relief is achieved 
in periods before the PRT rate becomes zero. 
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Chart A4 
 
 
 
Chart A5 
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Chart A6
 
 
From Charts A6, A7 and A8 it is seen that higher cost fields may receive 
no relief at $50 or $40 and little relief at $60.   At $40 only 3 low cost fields 
receive adequate relief.   At $60 only the high costs fields fail to obtain 
adequate relief. 
The level of costs changes for a few fields with a change in the oil price 
(fields 19, 25, 27 and 31 have lower production at $40 and fields 21, 26, 
34, 35 and 36 have higher production at $60 and this changes the unit cost).  
The decommissioning relief may change with the oil price.  At $40 only 
fields 19, 21, 22, 24, 25 and 27 maintain the same level of relief, but all the 
others have lower decommissioning relief (they are less able to use 
supplement or allowances).  At $60, fields 19, 22 and 25 maintain their 
level of decommissioning relief, but all others have higher 
decommissioning relief (they are better able to use the supplement and IA). 
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Chart A7 
 
 
 
Chart A8 
 
